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MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923”
TENTATIVE RULING
Case: [Title] (2022 – 01254297)
Calendar No.:
Date: 09/28/22
[Motion Type]
MOTION TO QUASH
Respondents Charles D’Auria and Karrie D’Auria’s Motion to Quash the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records from Financial Institutions (ROA 26) is DENIED.
By this motion, Respondents seek to quash subpoenas directed to: (1) Navy Federal Credit Union; (2) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.; (3) Bank of America, N.A.; (4) USAA Life Insurance Company; and (5) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Respondents seek to quash the subpoenas on the following grounds: (i) the documents are protected by the right to privacy; (ii) Petitioner lacks standing to bring her causes of action; and (iii) the categories are overbroad.
Standing. Discovery in probate matters is governed by the Civil Discovery Act (Probate Code § 1000(a) [“Except to the extent that this code provides applicable rules, the rules of practice applicable to civil actions, including discovery proceedings and proceedings under Title 3a (commencing with Section 391) of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, apply to, and constitute the rules of practice in, proceedings under this code. All issues of fact joined in probate proceedings shall be tried in conformity with the rules of practice in civil actions”); CCP §§ 2016.010 et seq.)
The standard for determining the scope of discovery is set forth in CCP §2017.010, which provides:
“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself amissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”
(Emphasis added.) So long as the documents relate to any claim or defense asserted in the proceeding, they are discoverable. In determining whether discovery is allowed, the court looks only to the pleadings and not to the viability or truth of those pleadings. (CCP § 2017.010.) The issue of standing is not a proper objection to discovery.
Privacy. The subpoenas directed to Navy Federal Credit Union, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America and Wells Fargo each sought the following categories of documents: (i)all “bank documents” pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or her Estate; (ii) all “income documents” pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (iii) all documents pertaining to the real properties under the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (iv) all communications with Charles J. D’Auria pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (v) all communications with other third parties pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (vi) all communications with Setsuko H. Connor or anyone acting on her behalf pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor. (Separate Statement (included at the conclusion of ROA 26) at 2:8-4:12.)
The subpoena to USAA Life Insurance Company sought the following categories of documents: (i) all documents pertaining any USAA account held by or relating to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust; (ii) all communications with Setsuko H. Connor or anyone acting on her behalf; (iii) all communications with Charles J. D’Auria pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (iv) all income documents relating to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; and (v) all documents pertaining to real properties held by Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor.
The period of time for most of the categories is 1-1-17 to the present.
The scope of discovery is very broad. (See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. C. v. Lee (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 40; Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249; and Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711.) “Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery." (Mercury Interactive Cop. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.) As the California Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531:
“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature's preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery. [Citation.]”
(Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 540.)
The court further stated:
“Section 2017.010 and other statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.] This means that ‘disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.’ [Citation.]”
(Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 541.)
Respondents seek to quash the subpoenas on the ground that they invade Decedent’s privacy rights. Privacy rights involve constitutional, statutory, and public policy considerations which the court must consider. Any right of privacy belonging to Decedent ceased with her death. (Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 59, 62 [“It is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded. . . . [Citations.] Further, the right does not survive but dies with the person.”].)
Some of the categories seeks communications with Charles D’Auria or other third persons relating to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor. To the extent those individuals have privacy rights in the requested documents, the court is guided by the balancing test set forth in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557). As explained in Williams:
“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interest disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interest or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, they are disapproved.”
(Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 557.)
Petitioner alleges Respondents unduly influenced and engaged in financial elder abuse regarding Setsuko H. Connor. They allege the wrongful conduct began on 1-27-17 when Setsuko’s husband passed away. The subpoenaed records are related to those claims within the meaning of CCP § 2017.010. In this case, under the balancing required by Williams, the court finds that the right to discovery overcomes the limited right to privacy, if any.
Overbreadth. Respondents argue that the documents are overbroad. An objection that a subpoena is “overly broad” is a way of asserting either that the subpoena is unduly burdensome or outside the scope of discovery. As set forth above, the subpoenaed documents are “relevant” within the meaning of the California discovery statutes. As for burden, “[t]he objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice. Hence, the trial court is not empowered to sustain an objection in toto, when the same is predicated upon burden, unless such is the only method of rendering substantial justice.” (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418.) To that end, an “objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549, citing West Pico, 56 Cal.2d at 417.) Respondents do not provide any evidence regarding the burden nor could they, because they are not the responding entity on any of the five subpoenas and the burden of responding is not theirs.
The motion is DENIED. The requests for sanctions are DENIED.
Petitioner is to give notice.
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