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Tentative Rulings

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Date: 09/28/2022

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Case Name

Tentative

(2019 – 01048544)

Lutton- Probate

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923”

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  (2019 – 01048544)

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/8/22

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Karen Lutton’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ROA 270) is DENIED.

Judicial Notice. Karen Lutton’s Request for Judicial Notice (ROA 272) is GRANTED as to Exhibits 1-10. Kimberly M. Jones and 150 Newport Center Drive, LLC‘s Request for Judicial Notice (ROA 289) is GRANTED as to Exhibit 1.

While the Court takes judicial notice of the documents attached to the requests for judicial notice, it does not take judicial notice of the truths asserted within those documents. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCourt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [“Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof.”]; see also Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [“‘[t]aking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents’”]; and Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145 [court may take judicial notice of existence of documents in court file but not truth of hearsay].

Motion. Karen Lutton (“Karen”) moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Kimberly M. Jones and 150 Newport Center Drive, LLC’s (collectively “Kimberly”) Verified Petition for Order to Allow the Filing of a Creditors’ Claim Pursuant to California Probate Code Section 9103 (ROA 71) on the ground that the petition is futile as the creditor’s claim is time-barred.

“A defense motion for judgment on the pleadings is akin to a demurrer and is properly granted only if the complaint does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against that defendant. We treat the pleadings as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” (Hudson v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 392, 407-408, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 321, citing Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. Of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.)

Further, “[r]esolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806.) This is because “[t]here are no hard and fast rules for determining what facts or circumstances will compel inquiry by the injured party and render him chargeable with knowledge. [Citation.] It is a question for the trier of fact.” (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 597 [reversing judgment after demurrer].) It is a question of law only when “reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence . . “ (Snow v. A.H. Robins Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 120, 128 [reversing summary judgment].

Karen’s motion is based on the assertion that both Kimberly Jones and 150 Newport Center Drive, LLC were served with a Notice of Administration/Notice to Creditors on 4-11-19. (Motion at ¶ 1.i-k; RJN, Exhibits 7-9.) The court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 7-9 but only for the fact of their existence. The court does not and could not take judicial notice of the underlying act of service, nor could the court take judicial notice of receipt by Kimberly Jones or 150 Newport Center Drive, LLC.

The verified petition asserts that Karen did not provide notice to Petitioners. (Petition, ¶ 12.) For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must presume that assertion is true. Exhibits 7-9 do not overcome that assertion.

The motion is DENIED.

Opposing parties to give notice.

 

 

(2022 – 01254297)

 Connor- Trust

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923”

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title] (2022 – 01254297)

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

[Motion Type]

MOTION TO QUASH

Respondents Charles D’Auria and Karrie D’Auria’s Motion to Quash the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records from Financial Institutions (ROA 26) is DENIED.

By this motion, Respondents seek to quash subpoenas directed to: (1) Navy Federal Credit Union; (2) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.; (3) Bank of America, N.A.; (4) USAA Life Insurance Company; and (5) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Respondents seek to quash the subpoenas on the following grounds: (i) the documents are protected by the right to privacy; (ii) Petitioner lacks standing to bring her causes of action; and (iii) the categories are overbroad.

Standing. Discovery in probate matters is governed by the Civil Discovery Act (Probate Code § 1000(a) [“Except to the extent that this code provides applicable rules, the rules of practice applicable to civil actions, including discovery proceedings and proceedings under Title 3a (commencing with Section 391) of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, apply to, and constitute the rules of practice in, proceedings under this code. All issues of fact joined in probate proceedings shall be tried in conformity with the rules of practice in civil actions”); CCP §§ 2016.010 et seq.)

The standard for determining the scope of discovery is set forth in CCP §2017.010, which provides:

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself amissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

(Emphasis added.) So long as the documents relate to any claim or defense asserted in the proceeding, they are discoverable. In determining whether discovery is allowed, the court looks only to the pleadings and not to the viability or truth of those pleadings. (CCP § 2017.010.) The issue of standing is not a proper objection to discovery.

Privacy. The subpoenas directed to Navy Federal Credit Union, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America and Wells Fargo each sought the following categories of documents: (i)all “bank documents” pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or her Estate; (ii) all “income documents” pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (iii) all documents pertaining to the real properties under the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (iv) all communications with Charles J. D’Auria pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (v) all communications with other third parties pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (vi) all communications with Setsuko H. Connor or anyone acting on her behalf pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor. (Separate Statement (included at the conclusion of ROA 26) at 2:8-4:12.)

The subpoena to USAA Life Insurance Company sought the following categories of documents: (i) all documents pertaining any USAA account held by or relating to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust; (ii) all communications with Setsuko H. Connor or anyone acting on her behalf; (iii) all communications with Charles J. D’Auria pertaining to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; (iv) all income documents relating to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor; and (v) all documents pertaining to real properties held by Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor.

The period of time for most of the categories is 1-1-17 to the present.

The scope of discovery is very broad.  (See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. C. v. Lee (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 40; Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249; and Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711.) “Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.”  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery." (Mercury Interactive Cop. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.) As the California Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531:

“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature's preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery. [Citation.]” 

(Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 540.)

The court further stated:

“Section 2017.010 and other statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.] This means that ‘disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.’ [Citation.]”

(Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 541.)

Respondents seek to quash the subpoenas on the ground that they invade Decedent’s privacy rights. Privacy rights involve constitutional, statutory, and public policy considerations which the court must consider. Any right of privacy belonging to Decedent ceased with her death. (Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 59, 62 [“It is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded. . . . [Citations.] Further, the right does not survive but dies with the person.”].)

Some of the categories seeks communications with Charles D’Auria or other third persons relating to the Setsuko H. Connor Trust and/or Setsuko H. Connor. To the extent those individuals have privacy rights in the requested documents, the court is guided by the balancing test set forth in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557). As explained in Williams

“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interest disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interest or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, they are disapproved.”  

(Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 557.)

Petitioner alleges Respondents unduly influenced and engaged in financial elder abuse regarding Setsuko H. Connor. They allege the wrongful conduct began on 1-27-17 when Setsuko’s husband passed away. The subpoenaed records are related to those claims within the meaning of CCP § 2017.010. In this case, under the balancing required by Williams, the court finds that the right to discovery overcomes the limited right to privacy, if any.

Overbreadth. Respondents argue that the documents are overbroad. An objection that a subpoena is “overly broad” is a way of asserting either that the subpoena is unduly burdensome or outside the scope of discovery. As set forth above, the subpoenaed documents are “relevant” within the meaning of the California discovery statutes. As for burden, “[t]he objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice. Hence, the trial court is not empowered to sustain an objection in toto, when the same is predicated upon burden, unless such is the only method of rendering substantial justice.” (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418.) To that end, an “objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549, citing West Pico, 56 Cal.2d at 417.) Respondents do not provide any evidence regarding the burden nor could they, because they are not the responding entity on any of the five subpoenas and the burden of responding is not theirs.

The motion is DENIED. The requests for sanctions are DENIED.

Petitioner is to give notice.

 

 

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title] ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

[Motion Type]

 

 

(2021 – 01213565)

Saheli-Elder Abuse

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  (2021 – 01213565)

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

MOTION FOR FEES; MOTION TO STRIKE

Petitioner Parichehr Saheli’s Motion for Fees and Costs (ROA 270) is GRANTED in the amount of $62,475.58.

Respondent Ramin Zabeti’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Tax, Costs (ROA 301) is DENIED.

Both parties complain that the other’s motion is untimely. To the extent that is true, the court forgives any delay and deems both motions timely. (Rule 3.1700(b)(3); Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 155; Adam v. DeCharon (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 708, 713.)

In addition to arguing that the motion for fees in untimely, Respondent also argues that fees should not be awarded because Petitioner was not the prevailing party. Pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.03(t), the prevailing party in on a request for an Elder Abuse Restraining Order (“EARO”) “may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees . . .” Petitioner was the prevailing party as she obtained a restraining order against Respondent.

The court awards Petitioner, as prevailing party, fees and costs under § 15657.03(t).

Calculation of attorneys’ fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095-1096.) The calculation must be based on “a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time.” For purposes of the calculation, “[t]he reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Id.) The court is not bound by the evidence and argument provided by the party seeking the fees. Under California law, “[t]he court has a duty, independent of any objection, to assure that the amount and mode of payment of attorney fees are fair and proper, and may not simply act as a rubberstamp for the parties’ agreement.” (In re Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 555.) “The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426.)

Petitioner seeks fees and costs of $71,855.08. Petitioner’s counsel claims 34.5 hours of time at $450.00 per hour and 170.75 hours at $300 per hour. The court finds the hourly rates reasonable. The court finds the hours spent were reasonable with some exceptions, as follows. The court deducts:

(i)           the hours (6.6 hours at $300 per hour and .5 hours at $75 per hour for a total of $2017.50) and costs ($12) incurred in connection with the ex parte application re: service by alternative means as the application was denied (ROA 51);

(ii)          (ii) 3/4 of the hours incurred in connection with the motion to quash (5.55 hours at $300 per hour for a total of $1,650) as the motion was granted based on the Petitioner’s withdrawal of the allegations of financial abuse; and

(iii)         (iii) the hours incurred for a second attorney to attend the hearings on the restraining order (19 hours at $300 for a total of $5,700).

The deductions total $9,379.50.

Fees and costs are, therefore, awarded in the total amount of $62,475.58.

Moving party to give notice.

 

 

(2020 – 01140902)

Strickland- Probate

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  (2020 – 01140902)

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT

Petitioner Carl Strickland’s Motion for Reimbursement of Costs and Fees for Petition for Order of Conveyance, PC 850(2)(C), and PC 856 (ROA 135) is DENIED.

Petitioner seeks reimbursement of costs and fees incurred in connection with his Verified Petition for Order of Conveyance (ROA 108). He invokes Probate Code §§ 850(2)(C), 856 and 10800(a)(1) in support of his request. Sections 850 and 856 do not provide for an award of fees. Section 10800(a)(1) provides for compensation for services rendered by the personal representative. Petitioner was not appointed personal representative (ROA 105), so he is not entitled to fees as a representative under § 10800.

The motion is DENIED.

The court will give notice.

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

[Motion Type]

 

 

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/21/22

 

 

 

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/21/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

[Motion Type]

 

 

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22

 

 

 

()

MOTION FOR FEES 2022 01252923

TENTATIVE RULING

Case:  [Title]  ()

Calendar No.:

Date: 09/28/22